Grassroots + Power V: Iran

I spent a lot of arts-policy-brainwork on my diversity posts earlier this week, and so now my posting brain is looking back at politics again and getting excited -- probably based on my optimism about the health care bill.

At any rate, if you haven't seen Andrew Sullivan's extensive, expert coverage of today's protests across the country of Tehran, start with this post and work your way forwards. There are a lot of posts, but most of them are fairly short. I highly suggest watching at least a few of the Youtube videos.

A couple points:

1. Mainstream media fail, per usual. One of Sullivan's readers actually points out accurately that the bigger fail is the MSM's failure to provide the context of the recent bomb attempt, inasmuch as there's basically a war going on in Yemen that we're at least tangentially involved in, against al Qaeda. If you're keeping count, that means we're fighting al Qaeda in five countries: Somalia (where US airstrikes have been supporting an Ethopian force), Yemen (where we've been supporting a largely Saudi force), Pakistan (where we've been supporting the Pakistani government), Afghanistan (directly), and a few remaining in Iraq (directly).
2. A few months ago, I found myself having anonymous comments blasting my comments on Obama's arts policy. My response was generally "meh," but I was rather insulted by the implication that I didn't understand the relationship between grass-roots and power, considering as I wrote a play about it and it's my favorite topic. So I decided to tackle the subject in a series of posts.
   
   
   What's interesting to me about this Iran thing is how it's playing out in a rather textbook example of what President Vaclav Havel wrote in his essay "Power of the Powerless." When Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn asked of the Soviet Union, "For how else can something dead pretend it is living except by erecting a scaffolding of lies?" and Vaclav Havel formulated the same idea by saying that "living in truth" was the way to dismember the state that lives on lies, they would not be surprised to see what's going on in Iran.
   
   
   I remember once in school, one of my history teachers said that the original form of democracy was the Greek Tyrants: in order to stay in power, they had to compete for the affections of the military, because without the military, they were nothing. The military were the first constituency.
   
   
   Now we see that a new tipping point has been reached in Iran. Take this video, in which the once-feared Basij have been cornered, are begging forgiveness, pleading to be released by angry protesters who shout "are you only brave on your motorcycle." Other videos involve burning Basij buildings or stealing their helmets and their sticks. They are aiming their blow right at the heart of the "Scaffolding of lies" that props up the Ayatollah: the lie that his power is absolute.
   
   
   When the protests began months ago, protesters wore masks to conceal their identity. Now, the Basij wear masks and beg to be forgiven; the protesters are the ones with the cameras.
3. My last point: if you watch any of the videos, you'll see hundreds of people with cell phones in the air, or cameras, documenting the revolution as it happens. All I want to say about that is that no single detail in this entire affair has so powerfully grounded me in feeling that the Iranian students are just like me. When I was at Barack Obama's rally before the primaries, or when I was at New Year's, it was the same thing -- the modern way we document our lives as it was happening.
   
   
   It made me realize something: when (not if) the Iranian people manage to overthrow the Ayatollah and create a more representative democracy (which may still be lead by Ayatollahs, but will be far more representative), the face of Iran is going to be transformed: it is going to become a face we recognize. We won't have to whisper between ourselves wondering exactly how insane or simply greedy their leadership is, they won't be born of a tradition and history unfathomable to us. We'll have some common experiences--we'll recognize each other. They'll still want nukes, they'll still resist our foreign policy interests, and I don't want to think about what they think about Israel. But we'll recognize them and they'll recognize us. It'll be the first step.

It's pretty exciting, and a great way to wrap up 2009. We started it with the optimism that change was coming, even in the midst of a falling economy we would have health care reform. In the middle of it, things looked bleak for health care reform as the town halls poisoned the atmosphere, but the response to the Iranian election was moving, gave us hope. Then they faded away, and I feared the worst for them. But now both have come together.

What I hope for 2010:

1. The investigation into torture yields prosecution.
2. Our troops are largely withdrawn from Iraq.
3. Guantanamo closes.
4. A review of Don't Ask Don't Tell and the Defense of Marriage Act by the end of the year.

I'm also hoping that California sets into motion drafting of a new constitution.

Sustainability II: Legitimacy Pt. 1

I got into a discussion the other day about the future of Iran following the Iran Elections with my mother the other day (just wait, I promise this is about arts development). She was expressing her (understandable) frustration that Obama didn't intervene more in the Iran Election, to do something to help out the protesters. She didn't understand why Moussavi didn't call upon the world for help.

I tried to explain to her the crucial importance of legitimacy in government. An illegitimate government is an unsustainable government. In fact, I wish I had some high-power quotations from Rousseau or Montesquieu, or the founding fathers, because that's what the Enlightenment was based upon. Governments that are illegitimate are unstable, and the Enlightenment sought to bring stability to war-torn Europe by creating more legitimate governments into power.

Moussavi could ask for foreign intervention to help counterbalance the physical force of Khameni's government, but if he did, he'd lose that crucial bit of legitimacy that defines his movement. The movement is based on two key principles:

1) Allowing the Iranian people to self-determine their own government
2) Using legal, peaceful processes to ensure that this happens.

Clearly, whether or not Moussavi would be brought into power by a US-led intervention, or by UN Peacekeepers, is irrelevant. Forcing Moussavi into power violates both of those principles, and he loses his legitimacy. Moussavi understands legitimacy rather intimately, because the only reason he is in the position that he is is because Khameni rather stunningly gave up a huge foundation of legitimacy that the government was predicated on.

If you look at the above two principles, both of them were (at least to a large degree) applicable to the post-1979 Iran, well through Ahmadinejad's first election. There was a high degree of censorship (which is not what the people are protesting) and some election massaging, but in several structural ways you could demonstrate that Iran was holding to those principles more than any other Muslim nation in the area, minus perhaps Turkey.

To bring this to arts groups, which I've really been talking about all this time: the sense of "sustainability" of an arts organization is very much linked to the sense of "legitmacy." The question, really, is how does an arts leader:

1) Identify legitimacy
2) Cultivate legitimacy

I think I have a few posts left in me for today on the subject of legitimacy. But the first thing I want to say is that for an arts community, it is crucial to keep an eye on whether or not your actions are creating legitimacy--and not the window-dressing of legitimacy. For instance, a building is not legitimacy, never mind the fact that it tells the community that you're a powerful, stable organization. It is no more a sign of "legitimacy" than the Basij are symbols of the legitimacy. The demonstration of resources is not a sign of legitimacy (although the demonstration of stability might be, in some cases, part of legitimacy).

New Islam

Via The Daily Dish, a post from Irshad Manji:

Here’s news of a superstar Iranian scholar — and devout Muslim — who’s shaking the core of Islam as we know it. Abdulkarim Soroush argues that the Qur’an could have been authored by the Prophet Muhammad, not by God.

Like the Muslim Summit which signals a shift in our relations with the Muslim World, I again warn against taking this a little too enthusiastically for two reasons.

1) This is going to create a sectarian split. I'm not saying that because of anything against Muslims--this is the sort of theological split that caused divisions in Europe, and which continues to split churches (see: Episcopalian/Anglicans and homosexuals or Southern Baptists). People will decide for themselves: do I agree with this view, or do I not? There are plenty of people all over the world who already believe that the Qu'ran is a human document, but in terms of Muslim institutions, I think it's fairly rare. Suppose in Iraq, certain mosques and groups form around this idea of a humanist Islam (one in which the truth is not absolutely known, and must be sought out and discovered). And others believe that this is heresy. In a country like Turkey that might not cause violence; in a country like Iraq where people routinely kill each other over beliefs, it might foment more violence before it creates more peace.

2) The United States will want to support this line of thinking, because it is a distinctly anti-extremist strain. It gives moderate Muslims one rhetorical strategy to fight extremism. And the United States' goal is to fight extremism. But if these sects square off, it would be dangerous to side too closely with anyone, at risk of alienating others. After all, some Muslims may believe that the Qu'ran is the revealed word of God and because of that are moderate--I remember reading the injunction to respect all of the people's of the book, be they Christian, Jew, or Sabian. I'm fully aware that the Qu'ran also cuts the other way on the issue.

I'm not saying don't hope. I'm just saying we need to have two eyes: one for the opportunities and the other for the traps along the way. We need to be careful how we take advantage of this sort of strain in Muslim thinking to minimize the blowback.

Conversationalism + 2008: How Bin Laden Will Lose The 2008 Election

I was once reading a text that was trying, through belabored logic, to prove that September 11th was a Performance Art piece. Of course, it all depends on what you consider "art" to be. It's hard to define September 11th in a way that is separate from art, but it strains the term "art" to the point of being almost meaningless.

Such an argument belies the dual role of terrorism. From one aspect, the act of terror is artistic (not in the positive sense) in many ways: it is carefully planned, it is loaded with intentional symbolism, and is created more for the benefit of its audience than its actual tactical value. Bin Laden attacked the World Trade Center because it was a symbol that he wanted to attack. Part of the goal (part) was the pain, fear, and sorrow he instilled in every American, which he thought would come closer to achieving his aims. In a way, terrorism is actually closer to propaganda than art (try finding that line).

But there is, of course, a second role of terrorism which is not in any way attached to art: it is an act of destruction. This is actually important for me in distinguishing art from terrorism: art is, on the whole, an act of creation.

I'm saying all this as a way of looking at terrorism as a very flawed mode of communication. It's rather like the point in an argument when the words fall away and someone decides to throw a punch. But in terms of the overall world culture, the point of terrorism is to influence the culture.

How might Bin Laden want to influence our culture? He has many achievable, specific goals as part of his campaign, and between his tapes and his actions he wants them put on the table. But the fundamental success of 9/11 is the key to his first and foremost objective: he wants to be a part of our national dialogue.

If Bin Laden saw his role today in our culture as the be-all and end-all of evil (the way Adolf Hitler was and is), I think he would be happy. We have elevated him to a position wherein his concerns are of concern to us all.

Last weekend, al Qaeda allegedly got back in the game, in terms of bombings. And their allies, the Taliban, are slowly mounting the war in Afghanistan, and gaining ground. The former is terrorism; the latter is guerilla warfare.

What are we talking about this week? Well, the first debate spent a lengthy amount of time talking about Afghanistan and Pakistani sovereignty, but the name "bin Laden" and "al Qaeda" was not a centerpoint of the debate. We were talking tactically; we were not speaking out of fear. And still, the number one issue on America's mind is the economy. Bin Laden is not the biggest threat to Americans: foreclosure is. Bankruptcy is.

What does this mean for Bin Laden? It means that his group returns to being marginalized on the world stage. It means that the United States is free to take action without hushed talk about "emboldening the enemy." It means that our public discourse will be free of the misleading connections of every evil in the world to one super enemy.

This, of course, is why I was horrified the other night when I heard Tony Blair, on The Daily Show, say that all of the terrorists of the world were basically the same forces. More specifically, he said that Hezbollah, Hamas, the Sunni Militias, and the Taliban were all part of the same "forces" at work. To the degree that each of these are Islamic fundamentalist groups, perhaps. But that is where the similarity ends. As Jon Stewart rightly pointed out, each of these groups has predominantly nationalistic goals.

Contrast Hezbollah, for instance, with Al Qaeda in Iraq, or Al Qaeda in Europe. Both of those franchises were started by Islamic fundamentalists who looked to Bin Laden for leadership, and pledged their small fragment of Islamic fundamentalism to Bin Laden's aid. These groups are not growing outside of Afghanistan. Although Islamic Fundamentalism, as an ideology, continues to gain traction, they are not all linked and directed by Bin Laden, as Bin Laden might have dreamed.

There are more empirical links, in terms of weapons and funding. And those include Iran and Syria prominently. But those links also include China and Russia--not for ideological reasons, but for tactical reasons. After all, China may be supporting terrorism abroad, but is against the Islamic guerillas among the Uighurs, they are far less supportive.

Bin Laden will lose this election if he fails to turn the world conversation toward himself. And I have every faith that he will lose this election. I was worried, in the wake of the bombings, that he would come to dominate our national dialogue again, and ruin the chances of addressing the real problems we need to address in this nation. Thankfully, he may have taken lives and destroyed property, but he is losing the war.